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Abstract. This paper presents research comparing the effects of differ-
ent environments on the outcome of an extended Prisoner’s Dilemma,
in which agents have the option to abstain from playing the game. We
consider three different pure strategies: cooperation, defection and absti-
nence. We adopt an evolutionary game theoretic approach and consider
two different environments: the first which imposes no spatial constraints
and the second in which agents are placed on a lattice grid. We anal-
yse the performance of the three strategies as we vary the loner’s payoff
in both structured and unstructured environments. Furthermore we also
present the results of simulations which identify scenarios in which co-
operative clusters of agents emerge and persist in both environments.
Keywords: Artificial Life; Game Theory; Evolutionary Computation.
1 Introduction
Within the areas of artificial life and agent-based simulations, evolutionary games
such as the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma [2,15], and its extensions in the iterated
form, have garnered much attention and have provided many useful insights with
respect to adaptive behaviours. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game has attained this
attention due to its succinct representation of the conflict between individually
rational choices and choices that are for the better good. However, in many
social scenarios that we may wish to model, agents are often afforded a third
option — that of abstaining from the interaction. Incorporating this concept
of abstinence extends the Prisoner’s Dilemma to a three-strategy game where
agents can not only cooperate or defect but can also choose to abstain from
a game interaction. There have been a number of recent studies exploring this
type of game [5,7–9,16].
In addition to analysing the evolution of different strategies and different out-
comes, previous work has also explored the effect of imposing spatial constraints
on agent interactions. Traditionally, these studies assume no such constraints and
agents are free to interact with all other agents in well-mixed populations [2].
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However, many models consider restricting interactions to neighbourhoods of
agents on some pre-defined topology. These more expressive models include lat-
tices [6, 13], cycles and complete graphs [9], scale-free graphs [16] and graphs
exhibiting certain properties, such as clustering coefficients [11].
In this paper we adopt an evolutionary approach to evolve populations of
agents participating in the extended Prisoner’s Dilemma [12]. We consider two
different environmental settings: one with no enforced structure where agents
may interact with all other agents; and another in which agents are placed on a
lattice grid with spatial constraints enforced, where agents can play with their
immediate eight neighbours (Moore neighbourhood). In both environmental set-
tings, an agent’s fitness is calculated as the sum of the payoffs obtained through
the extended Prisoner’s Dilemma game interactions. We investigate the evolu-
tion of different strategies (cooperate, defect and abstain) in both spatial and
non-spatial environments. We are particularly interested in the effect of differ-
ent starting conditions (number of different strategies and placement of different
strategies) and the different values for the loner’s payoff (L) on the emergence of
cooperation. We identify situations where the simulations converge to an equi-
librium, where no further changes occur. These equilibria can be fully stable (no
change) or quasi-stable (with a small cycle length).
The paper outline is as follows: In Section 2 an overview of work in the ex-
tended game and of spatial evolutionary game theory is presented. Section 3
gives an overview of the methodology employed. In Section 4, we discuss the
non-spatial environment. We firstly present an analysis of pairwise interactions
between the three pure strategies. Secondly, evolutionary experiments using all
three strategies are presented. Thirdly, we explore the robustness of a population
of cooperative and abstaining strategies when a defecting strategy is added to
the population. In Section 5, we discuss the environment where agents are placed
on a lattice grid, in which their interactions are constrained by their local neigh-
bourhood. Again an analysis of pairwise interactions is first undertaken followed
by an exploration of the outcomes when all three strategies are randomly placed
on the grid. Based on these findings, we explore different starting groupings of
the three strategies, i.e. placed in a non-random manner on the grid. This will
allow identification of starting configurations that lead to stable cooperation.
2 Related Work
Abstinence has been studied in the context of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) since
Batali and Kitcher, in their seminal work [3], first introduced the optional variant
of the game. They proposed the opt-out or “loner’s” strategy, in which agents
could choose to abstain from playing the game, as a third option, in order to
avoid cooperating with known defectors. Using a combination of mathematical
analysis and simulations, they found that populations who played the optional
games could find routes from states of low cooperation to high states of coop-
eration. Subsequently, as this extension has grown in popularity and renown,
optional participation has been successfully incorporated into models alongside
other cooperation enhancing mechanisms such as punishment [7] and reputa-
tion [5, 14], and has been applied to probabilistic models [16].
The study of optional participation can be broadly separated into approaches:
one that directly incorporates abstinence into the traditional PD game (the
loner’s strategy), and another known as conditional cooperation. Models that
incorporate the loner’s strategy treat the option to abstain as an alternative
strategy for agents to employ [3, 9], separate to the option to cooperate or de-
fect. These models tend to be more grounded in mathematical models with less
of an emphasis on experimental simulations, which often-times have been shown
to produce unexpected results [6]. On the other hand, conditional cooperation
models [1, 8, 10], also known as conditional disassociation, incorporate absti-
nence into cooperation strategies. These models lend themselves more easily to
Axelrod-style tournaments [2]. They tend to focus on exit options or partner-
leaving mechanisms, and often lack a spatial aspect, which has since been shown
to increase the number of abstainer strategies thus increasing the chances of
cooperation evolving [9].
The work that most closely resembles our own is that of Hauert and Szabo´ [6].
They consider a spatially extended PD and public goods game (PGG), where
a population of N agents are arranged and interact on a variety of different
geometries, including a regular lattice. Three pure strategies (cooperate, defect
and abstain) are investigated using an evolutionary approach. Results showed
that the spatial organisation of strategies affected the evolution of cooperation,
and in addition, they found that the existence of abstainers was advantageous to
cooperators, because they were protected against exploitation. However, there
exists some major differences between their model and the one proposed here.
Hauert and Szabo´ focus on a simplified PGG as their primary model for group
interactions, and separately use the PD only for pairwise interactions. In our
model, agents interact by playing a single round of the PD with each of their
neighbours. Additionally, Hauert and Szabo´ focused on one set of initial condi-
tions for their simulations, using a fixed ratio of strategies. Our work explores a
wider range of initialization settings from which we gleam more significant in-
sights, and identify favourable configurations for the emergence of cooperation.
3 Methodology
In order to explore these strategies and, in particular, the effect of introducing
abstinence, we propose a set of experiments in which each agent randomly plays
a number of one-shot, two-person extended Prisoner’s Dilemma game. An evolu-
tionary approach is adopted with a fixed-size population where each agent in the
population is initially assigned a fixed strategy. Fitness is calculated and assigned
based on the payoffs obtained by the agents from playing the game. Simulations
are run until the population converges on a single strategy, or configuration of
strategies.
In the traditional Prisoner’s Dilemma game there are four payoffs correspond-
ing to the pairwise interaction between two agents. The payoffs are: reward for
mutual cooperation (R), punishment for mutual defection (P ), sucker’s payoff
(S) and temptation to defect (T ). The dilemma arises due to the following or-
dering of payoff values: S < P < R < T . When extending the game to include
abstinence, a fifth payoff is introduced, the loner’s payoff (L) is awarded to both
participants if one or both abstain from the interaction.
The value of L should be set such that: (1) it is not greater than R, otherwise
the advantage of not playing will be sufficiently large to ensure that players will
always abstain and (2) it is greater than S, otherwise there are no benefits to
abstaining. This enables us to investigate the values of L in the range [S,R],
which in turn contrasts with the definition used by Hauert and Szabo´ [6] who
define abstainers as strategies who perform better than groups of defectors but
worse than groups of mutually cooperating strategies. In their model, abstainers
receive a payoff less than R and greater than P . We choose to explore a more
exhaustive range of values. The payoffs for the extended Prisoner’s Dilemma
game are illustrated in Tab. 1 and are based on the standard values used by
Axelrod [2].
Tab. 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Matrix.
C D A
C R,R S,T L
D T,S P,P L
A L L L
(a) Extended game matrix.
Payoff Value
T 5
R 3
P 1
S 0
L ]0, 3[
(b) Payoff values.
As we aim to study the behaviour of agents in different scenarios, our first
model allows all agents to potentially interact (Sect. 4). Our second model places
topological constraints on the agent population which restricts the potential
interactions that can take place (Sect. 5). This allows for the comparison between
spatial and non-spatial environments and allows us to identify similarities and
differences in conditions that promote cooperation. For both environments, two
common sets of experiments are considered:
1. Pairwise comparisons: The abstainer strategies compete with one of the other
strategies; firstly, an equal number of cooperators (C) and abstainers (A);
and secondly, an equal number of defectors (D) and abstainers (A).
2. All three strategies present: We adopt an unbiased environment in which ini-
tially each agent is designated as a cooperator (C), defector (D) or abstainer
(A) with equal probability.
Moreover, to further explore the effect of adding the option of abstinence, a
third experiment is undertaken in the non-spatial environment, where we seed
the population with a majority of one type of strategy (abstainers) and explore
if the population is robust to invasion from (1) a cooperator and (2) a cooperator
and a defector (Sect. 4.3). In order to explore the effect of different initial spatial
configurations, we also undertake a third set of experiments in the spatial en-
vironment, which provide an insight in to the necessary spatial conditions that
may lead to robust cooperation (Sect. 5.3).
4 Non-spatial Environment
In this section, we present results of the experiments in the non-spatial environ-
ment and settings as described previously in Section 3. We use a tournament
selection with size 2.
4.1 Pairwise Comparisons
The simulations involving cooperators, C and abstainers A, verified the expected
outcomes where the cooperators quickly spread throughout the population re-
sulting in complete cooperation. This can be shown to be correct by calculating
the difference in the payoffs each strategy receives:
PC − PA = (|C − 1|R+ |A|L)− (|C|L+ |A− 1|L)
= |C − 1|(R− L)
As R > L, PC − PA > 0 and thus the cooperators always dominate. Our
simulations confirm this result.
When comparing D and A strategies and their payoffs, we see:
PD − PA = |D − 1|P + |A|L− |A+D − 1|L
= |D − 1|P − |D − 1|L
= |D − 1|(P − L)
If L = P , then either defectors or abstainers may dominate at any stage. If
L > P , then abstainers dominate. If L < P then defectors dominate. Figure 1a
illustrates this behaviour in simulations for different values of L with an initial
equal population of defectors and abstainers. For each simulation, 100 separate
runs are undertaken and the average of the numbers of each strategy present per
run are averaged per generation and plotted. It can be seen that when L < P ,
the defectors have a selective advantage and dominate. At L = P , neither the
defectors nor the abstainers have a clear advantage. When L > P , the abstainers
have the selective advantage and they now dominate in the majority of cases.
The above calculations assume all players play all other players; our simulations
approximate this result.
4.2 All Three Strategies
In this experiment, an unbiased environment, with an initial population consist-
ing of the same number of cooperators (C), defectors (D) and abstainers (A),
(a) Generation 50 given an initial equal
population of defectors and abstainers.
(b) Generation 50 given an initial equal
population of defectors, cooperators and
abstainers.
(c) Robustness: initial non-spatial popu-
lation of 1 cooperator and 99 abstainers.
(d) Robustness: initial non-spatial popu-
lation of 1 cooperator, 1 defector and 98
abstainers.
Fig. 1: Experiments with a non-spatial population.
is created. Figure 1b illustrates the behaviour at generation 50 across 100 indi-
vidual runs. For L < P defectors have already dominated the population. For
L = P , defectors still dominate but on a minority of runs abstainers dominate.
For L > P this dominance of the abstainers becomes more pronounced as the
payoff for abstainers increases. In fact, in some runs given the selective advantage
of abstainers over defectors, some cooperators outperform the defectors resulting
in a fully cooperative run.
4.3 Robustness
The previous experiments show the outcome for a range of starting conditions.
In this section, we explore the robustness of states to the introduction of a
defector. Initially, a population is created comprising one cooperator strategy
and the remainder of the strategies are all abstainers. In this situation, in the first
generation all strategies receive the same payoffs, L. Via tournament selection,
subsequent generations may comprise more than one cooperative strategy. If
this is the case, and these cooperative strategies are chosen to play against each
other, they receive a higher payoff than abstainers, and cooperation will flourish.
On the other hand, if the cooperative strategy is not selected for subsequent
generations, then the population will consist only of abstainer strategies. This is
illustrated in Fig. 1c, which shows the average of 100 runs. In any of these runs,
the evolutionary outcome is either a population comprising fully of cooperators
or a population comprising fully of abstainers. The value of L does not affect
this outcome as L < R is always true.
In the second robustness experiment, the initial population consists of 98
abstainers, 1 cooperator and 1 defector. Figure 1d shows the outcomes after
50 generations. When L < P , as seen previously, the defectors will have an
advantage over abstainers. However, due to tournament selection, there is a
possibility that a defector will not be chosen for subsequent generations. When
L > P , the abstainers have the advantage over the defectors given the possibility
of mutual defection among defectors. The defectors may continue to survive
in the population given the presence of cooperators whom they can exploit.
We witness that the cooperators can still do well given the benefits of mutual
cooperation. However, the number of runs in which cooperation flourishes is
reduced due to the presence of defectors. When L = P , defectors and abstainers
achieve the same payoff in their pairwise interactions. However, defectors may
do better in that they will exploit any cooperators. As the cooperators die out,
there is no selective advantage for defectors but a level of robustness to invasion
is observed.
In summary, these results show, when introducing one cooperator, abstainers
and cooperators can co-exist; but when adding one cooperator and one defector
more complex outcomes are possible.
5 Spatial Environments
In this section, we are interested in exploring the larger range of outcomes that
result from the introduction of the spatial constraints. For the following experi-
ments, we replace the tournament selection used in the non-spatial experiments
with a mechanism whereby an agent adopts the strategy of the best performing
neighbour strategy. This is in line with standard approaches in spatial simula-
tions [6, 13].
5.1 Pairwise Comparison between Agents
When placing cooperator and defector agents randomly on the lattice grid, the
defecting agents will spread amongst the cooperators echoing previous findings.
When cooperator and abstainer agents are randomly placed on the grid, we find
that if there are at least two cooperators beside each other, cooperation will
spread, irrespective of the value of L as cooperative agents playing with each
Fig. 2: Percentage of defectors and abstainers at L = 0.9, 1.0 and 1.1.
other will obtain a higher payoff than any adjacent abstainer agents. Thus, neigh-
bours will copy the cooperating strategy. Finally, when defector and abstainer
agents are randomly placed on the grid, we see from Fig. 2 that different out-
comes occur depending on the value of L. This is similar to the results observed
in the non-spatial pairwise comparison.
5.2 All three strategies
In this experiment, equal numbers of the three strategies are placed randomly
on the grid. The outcome for L < P is as expected with defectors quickly
dominating the population. However, in 65% of simulations small clusters of
cooperators survive thanks to the presence of the abstainers. The abstainers
give the cooperators a foothold, allowing them to ward off invasion from the
defectors.
For L = P , defectors once again dominate, despite the tie, as they are able
to exploit cooperators in the population. Once again, some small groups of co-
operators survive with the same probability.
A number of simulations are run varying L from 1.1 to 2.0 where results show
similar emergent evolutionary stable patterns across all values of L in this range.
There are two distinct outcomes; abstainers dominate; and abstainers dominate
with some sustained cooperation. Some level of cooperation is achieved on av-
erage in 51.5% of simulations for values of L in the range [1.1, 2.0]. In these
runs, a cooperative cluster (of minimum size 9), surrounded by defectors, forms
in the early generations and remains a stable feature in subsequent generations.
The presence of defectors, surrounding the cooperative cluster, prevents the ab-
stainers from being invaded by the cooperators. Similarly the defector strategies
remain robust to the spread of abstainers given their ability to exploit the coop-
erators. In essence, a symbiotic relationship is formed between cooperators and
defectors. Figure 3b shows a screenshot of a cooperator and defector cluster in a
simulation where abstainers have dominated. This configuration, once reached,
is stable in these settings.
(a) Glider (C and D) (b) Cluster (C and D) (c) Initial configuration of
C, A and D
Fig. 3: Experiments with a spatially organised population in a 100× 100 lattice
grid full populated with agents. The white dots represent cooperators (C), the
black dots indicate defectors (D), and the grey dots are the abstainers (A).
As the value of L increases we also witness newer phenomena. For L = 1.5
and L = 2.0, we see cycles between two states where some of the surrounding
defectors fluctuate from defector to abstainer and back again. We also see an
increase in the size and amount of clusters when they are formed. For L =
[1.7, 1.9], we see “gliders” [4] where a group of defectors flanked by a row of
cooperators seemingly move across the grid, as shown in Fig. 3a. In reality, the
cooperators invade the abstainers, the defectors invade the cooperators, and the
abstainers in turn invade the defectors.
5.3 Exploration of the Effect of Different Initial Spatial
Configurations
The aim of this experiment is to investigate different initial spatial settings of
cooperators, defectors and abstainers to further explain the results witnessed in
the previous experiment (Sect. 5.2). One interesting outcome from the previous
simulations involved a stable situation where one strategy (inner) could survive
in a cluster of the same strategies due to being surrounded fully by another
strategy (middle) which, in turn, is itself surrounded fully by the third (outer)
strategy (see Fig. 3b). In this case, it appeared that the inner strategy needs the
protection of the middle strategy to avoid invasion by the outer strategy and
that the middle strategy in turn needs the inner strategy to avoid invasion by
the outer strategy. It was noted that for cooperators surrounded by defectors, a
minimum inner cluster size of 9 was needed in order for this outcome to emerge.
Given three strategies, we consider all six permutations with respect to the
placement of strategies in the three different positions of inner, middle and outer
with an inner cluster of size 9, a middle cluster comprising 3 layers around the
inner cluster, and the remaining outer portion of the grid containing only the
third strategy. We label these six spatial configurations according to the first
letter of the strategy (C, D, A) and their initial position (inner, middle, outer).
Figure 3c is an illustration of the initial conditions for the “C-A-D” spatial
configuration. We note that given any initial configuration the outcome will not
vary. This means that there is no reason, other than for verification, to run a
configuration multiple times. Two values of L are explored: L < P and L > P
for each configuration. For L = P , simulations reveal no selective pressure for
interactions between defectors and abstainers. These results involve a level of
stochasticity which do not give any meaningful insights, and thus are not further
discussed in this paper.
In every permutation of A, C, and D when L < P the defectors dominate.
Both defectors and cooperators invade the abstainers and then the defectors
begin to invade the cooperators. We again observe that many clusters of cooper-
ators, of different sizes but of minimum size 9, remain robust to this invasion, as
a result to the presence of the abstainers. The initial placement of the strategies
dictates how many cooperative clusters are likely to remain robust to invasion
by defection. Table 2 provides an overview of the results from each scenario
when L > P . The existence of the abstainer strategies, in addition to the initial
placement of the strategies, ensures that defection will not dominate in all of
the scenarios. In fact, in one scenario (CAD), it results in a fully cooperative
population.
Tab. 2: Results of Seeded Initial Settings.
Shape Outcome Description
DCA Defection spreads Abstainers are invaded. Clusters of cooperators
survive amongst dominant defectors.
DAC Defection spreads Similar outcome as above.
CDA Structurally stable A symbiotic cluster of cooperators and defectors
persist among the abstainers.
CAD Cooperation spreads Abstainers buffer cooperators against defectors,
allowing them to dominate.
ACD Abstainers invaded Cooperators invade the inner abstainers to cre-
ate a cluster resistant to defector invasion.
ADC Abstinence spreads Clusters of cooperators, surrounded by defec-
tors survive within the abstainer majority (see
Fig. 3b).
We have seen in comparison in the non-spatial experiments that all strate-
gies may influence each other’s payoffs and we observe a smaller set of outcomes.
When all the strategies are placed together, either defectors or abstainers dom-
inate. In the spatial scenarios, there are outcomes with robust clusters of co-
operators. In the robustness experiments, in the non-spatial scenarios, a largely
cooperative population is easily invaded by defectors; this is not the case in the
spatial scenario where we have shown that cooperators can be robust to invasion
for specific initial settings. In the non-spatial scenarios, with the existence of
abstainers, the population is largely robust and results in a mixed equilibrium.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, two different environments in which populations of agents played
an extended version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma were considered: non-spatial
where all N agents were potential partners for each other, and a population
organised on a lattice grid where agents can only play with their 8 immediate
neighbours. For both scenarios, three sets of experiments were performed: a pair-
wise comparison of two strategies; experiments involving all three strategies and
an exploration of the conditions leading to cooperative outcomes.
In the non-spatial environment, for the pairwise comparison, with agents
initially having equal number of cooperators and abstainers, cooperation spreads
throughout the population. The outcome when agents initially have an equal
number of defectors and abstainers is dependent on the loner’s payoff (L). When
all three strategies are initially equally present in the population the value of the
loner’s payoff is again crucial. When the value of L is less than or equal to the
punishment for mutual defection, the dominant strategy is defection; in other
cases abstinence spreads as a strategy and this in turn can lead to cooperation
spreading. In the robustness experiments, we consider populations comprising
of agents with abstainer strategies and explore the effects of perturbing the
population by the addition of firstly, a cooperative agent and secondly agents
with strategies of cooperation and defection. Results show that only in the second
scenario does the value of L influence the outcome.
In the spatial experiments, similar outcomes arise for the pairwise compar-
isons. When considering equal numbers of agents with all three strategies some
similarities between the spatial and non-spatial results are noticed, but the spa-
tial organisation allows for the clustering of cooperative agents. For all values
of the loner’s payoff, defection dominates in addition to the presence of some
clusters of cooperators where these clusters are protected by abstainers . As the
loner’s payoff increases above 1.5, the size of these clusters of cooperative agents
increases. In the experiments considering different initial spatial configurations
interesting behaviour was noted for the six different possible starting initiali-
sations. In all cases, irrespective of the position of the cooperative strategies
initially, and the value of L, cooperative clusters persisted.
In previous work in the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma, it has been shown that
cooperation can be robust to invasion if a sufficiently large cluster of cooperators
form. However, given a random initialisation, this rarely happens and defectors
can dominate in most scenarios. With the introduction of abstainers, we see new
phenomena and a larger range of scenarios where cooperators can be robust to
invasion by defectors and can dominate.
Future work will involve extending our abstract model to more realistic sce-
narios. There are many documented scenarios of symbiosis between entities (in-
dividuals, species, plants and companies). In our simulations, we model sym-
biosis between three distinct entities. We are interested in identifying scenarios
where insights obtained in our spatial configurations may apply; for example, the
planting of specific plants (abstainers) to prevent the invasion one plant species
(defector) into another native species (cooperator).
Future work will also involve performing a more detailed investigation into
emergent evolutionary stable patterns witnessed at different values of L and the
exploration of other topologies with the goal of identifying structures that allow
robust cooperation.
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